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In this study, we develop a method that can statistically identify fund managers that 
exhibit selectivity in their trades and find that occurrences of good and bad selectivity exceed 
random expectation. Mutual fund managers exhibit selectivity by tilting their portfolios 
toward better performing stocks when they buy (sell) stocks with high sentiment betas 
preceding an increase (decrease) in investor sentiment. Conversely, funds that incorrectly 
time investor sentiment exhibit bad stock selection, explaining the above random incidence 
of this behavior. Our method distinguishes skill from fortuitous stock selection and provides 
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Does Selectivity in Mutual Fund Trades Exploit Sentiment Timing? 
 
In an efficient market, stocks would be correctly priced and mutual fund managers would only 
exhibit superior performances by chance. However, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) show that 
stocks are mispriced according to their sentiment betas and the prevailing level of investor 
sentiment. In an effort to improve performance, fund managers could use stock sentiment betas 
to assist in the selection of stocks in two ways. First, they might attempt to identify underpriced 
stocks for buying and overpriced stocks for selling. Second, they might attempt to time investor 
sentiment by buying (selling) high (low) sentiment beta stocks before an increase in sentiment, 
and conduct the opposite trades prior to a decrease in sentiment. 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) propose an analogous decomposition of stock selectivity1
                                                 
1We use the term “selectivity” to refer to a fund’s record of selecting stocks that exhibit better performances in the 
subsequent quarter that may have arisen from choosing mispriced stocks, timing the market or from luck. Although 
previous studies use the terms “selectivity” and “skill” interchangeably, we distinguish “selectivity” from “skill” and 
reserve the latter to describe the stock selection ability of particular fund managers who exhibit persistent selectivity. 
 and 
use the proxy “Active Share” for selecting mispriced stocks and the proxy “tracking error 
variance” for factor timing. However, both proxies measure selectivity only as a deviation from a 
benchmark portfolio albeit across different dimensions. We contribute to existing literature by 
developing a method that identifies selectivity, both good and bad, on a fund-by-fund basis in 
any calendar quarter. Moreover, our procedure involves a more direct measure of market timing 
using Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) indexes of investor sentiment. 
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The process of evaluating the stock selection skills of mutual fund managers is complicated 
by the selection of appropriate performance benchmarks, and extricating performance 
attributable to their trades from the impact of the extant portfolio. Moreover, allowance must be 
made for the constraints placed by a fund’s style objectives, trading costs, and portfolio 
diversification considerations on a fund manager’s trades. To accommodate these issues, we 
identify selectivity by observing an increased weighting of higher ranking stocks and decreased 
weighting of lower ranking stocks, rather than focusing on major portfolio changes or the 
acquisition of stocks that yield stellar performances.2
More specifically, to evaluate stock selection skill, we develop a two-step procedure. In the 
first step, we identify fund-quarters in which mutual fund managers that conduct trades exhibit, 
with statistical significance, good or bad selectivity. In the second step, we identify funds that 
exhibit selectivity over multiple quarters more frequently than randomly expected and classify 
the managers as skillful. Therefore, our contribution is extended to provide an innovative, 
objective, and practical procedure for evaluating individual fund managers. 
 The ranking of a stock in each fund’s 
portfolio is determined by the stock’s return performance in the subsequent quarter. Then, we 
assess fund manager selection skill from repeated incidences of selectivity. 
Using our method, we find that occurrences of both good and bad selectivity exceed random 
expectation. We also show that mutual fund managers who time investor sentiment by trading to 
                                                 
2The goal of tilting a fund’s portfolio toward better performing stocks is to improve fund performance. However, 
performance itself is an opaque measure of selectivity as several other factors also contribute to fund performance. 
Our measure of selectivity is more direct since it focuses on the performance of the stocks that funds trade. 
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alter their portfolio’s sentiment beta ahead of changes in investor sentiment more commonly 
exhibit selectivity (good or bad). More fund managers that buy (sell) high (low) sentiment beta 
stocks, thereby increasing the sentiment beta of their portfolio, exhibit good selectivity if 
investor sentiment subsequently increases. A higher proportion of fund managers that do the 
opposite prior to a decrease in sentiment also exhibit good selectivity. Furthermore, we also find 
that bad selectivity is more prevalent among fund-quarters that exhibit perverse timing. Perverse 
timing may be the consequence of mutual fund managers using their prediction of investor 
sentiment to alter the sentiment beta of their portfolio, where this prediction is incorrect. 
The elevated incidence of good stock selection could be attributed to the fulfillment of a 
goal; however, managers do not aim to pursue bad stock selection. Rather, a more plausible 
explanation for the incidence of systematically poor stock selection, which exceeds the incidence 
expected from “bad luck,” is an incorrect prediction resulting in perverse timing of sentiment. 
This paper is organized in the following manner. In Section I, we discuss the salient 
literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section II, we discuss the data and provide an overview 
of the methodology. In Section III, we detail the procedure for identifying selective trades and 
consider the interaction of selectivity and investor sentiment. In Section IV, we present the 





I. Investor Sentiment and Market Timing 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) develop a monthly sentiment index and show that following a 
month of high investor sentiment, speculative stocks exhibit lower average returns relative to 
safe, easy-to-arbitrage stocks.3
It is apparent from the literature that certain stocks become mispriced and that the level of 
mispricing varies according to the level of investor sentiment. When sentiment is high, mutual 
fund managers would be more likely to demonstrate their stock selection ability and achieve the 
objective of buying stocks that are underpriced and selling stocks that are overpriced. The 
testable implication is that more funds will exhibit selectivity when investor sentiment is high. 
We refer to this as the mispricing hypothesis.  
 This result is reversed in the month after investor sentiment is 
low. They reason that the attributes that make stocks speculative also cause them to be more 
difficult to value and arbitrage and may be captured by the stock’s sentiment beta or the co-
movement of its price with an “index of sentiment changes.” Antoniou, Doukas and 
Subrahmanyam (2011) also consider time variation related to investor sentiment and find greater 
momentum profits during high sentiment periods and attribute this to greater mispricing of 
stocks during periods of optimism. During periods of pessimism, momentum profits become 
insignificant.  
The level of investor sentiment is associated with mispricing, but changes to investor 
sentiment may also affect stock prices. Following Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) reasoning that a 
                                                 
3Baker and Wurgler (2006),  Glushkov (2006), and Duan, Hu, and McLean (2009) also find that stock prices deviate 
more from intrinsic value depending on the attributes of the stocks. 
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stock’s sentiment beta captures its relative price response to changes in investor sentiment, fund 
managers who believe that they can predict changes in sentiment may be motivated to trade 
stocks according to their expectations. That is, they may attempt to time the market with respect 
to investor sentiment.  
Early studies, such as Treynor and Mazuy (1966), attempt to detect market timing by 
focusing on the squared relation between fund returns and those of the benchmark portfolio. 
More recently, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2011) and Ferson and Mo (2012) use the holdings of 
fund portfolios to determine market timing. Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2011) compute 
unconditional fund betas from the weighted average of the stock betas in the portfolio and 
ascertain timing from changes in this beta and benchmark returns in the subsequent month. 
Furthermore, Ferson and Mo (2012) determine the covariance of portfolio weights with 
benchmark returns and identify market timing as a contribution to fund excess returns (alphas). 
However, in these studies, the focus on fund returns rather than the returns of the stocks the 
funds trade provides an indirect indication of selectivity and, therefore, market timing. Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009) also examine market timing by fund managers but use tracking error 
variance as a proxy. They reason that a fund that generally has the constituents of a benchmark 
index but concentrates the weighting on specific sectors incurs systematic risk relative to the 
index and generates a higher tracking error variance. Such funds are motivated by bets on market 
conditions that are favorable to that sector, which, in turn, may be affected by investor sentiment. 
However, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) do not distinguish funds that successfully time the 
market from those that make unsuccessful factor bets. Accordingly, losses from the latter may 
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nullify the profits earned by the former, thereby obscuring the relation between timing and 
returns. 
Cullen, Gasbarro, Monroe, and Zumwalt (2012) demonstrate that mutual fund portfolios 
with high (low) weighted averages of stock sentiment betas perform better when investor 
sentiment increases (decreases). Moreover, they find that mutual fund managers conduct trades 
to alter their sentiment beta, thereby raising the likelihood that fund managers will make such 
adjustments in an attempt to time predicted changes in investor sentiment. That is, fund 
managers may attempt to time investor sentiment by trading stocks according to the expected 
performance of the stocks in the predicted market conditions; in doing this, their portfolio’s 
sentiment beta is altered. If they are successful in their prediction and increase (decrease) their 
sentiment beta ahead of an increase (decrease) in investor sentiment, more funds would exhibit 
good selectivity. However, if their predictions are unsuccessful, more funds would exhibit poor 
selectivity. We refer to this as the sentiment prediction hypothesis. 
To test this hypothesis, we substitute the sentiment beta for the unconditional beta used 
by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2011); however, with the application of the procedure given by 
Cullen, Gasbarro, Monroe, and Zumwalt (2012), we can determine, in any quarter, which of the 
adjustments to fund sentiment betas are statistically significant. We relate the changes funds 
make to their sentiment beta to subsequent changes in investor sentiment measured ex-post using 
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Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) sentiment changes index.4
 
 This relationship provides a direct 
measure of market timing that we use to identify funds that successfully and unsuccessfully time 
investor sentiment without the need to consider fund returns. 
II. Data Description and Methodology 
A. Data Description 
We obtain the quarterly stock holdings of all US equity mutual funds from the Thomson 
Financial Services Ltd. database for the period between 1991 and 2005. We infer transactions 
from changes to the holdings, while allowing for stock capitalization changes. Monthly stock 
price and return data are obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and are 
used to calculate quarterly excess returns before these are combined with the holdings data.5
                                                 
4Massa and Yadav (2012) specifically consider investor sentiment; however, they only consider timing to the extent 
that they consider the preferences of fund managers for holding stocks that react in a contrary manner to the level of 
investor sentiment or exhibit “sentiment contrarian behavior.” 
 We 
5We restrict our sample to funds with average equity holdings exceeding 80% and average cash holdings below 10% 
of fund assets to ensure that our data encompasses most of the changes to a mutual fund’s portfolio. Additionally, we 
must be able to replicate within 10% of the value of the fund’s net tangible assets by using the stock holdings data 
and assuming start-of-quarter prices for the stock for it to remain in our sample. 
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B. Overview of the Method 
We consider whether mutual funds exhibit selectivity by examining the stocks fund 
managers choose to trade in one period and whether fund managers display skill in stock 
selection by examining fund selectivity over multiple periods. Funds are deemed to exhibit good 
selectivity if fund managers increase (decrease) the weighting of stocks that subsequently 
become superior (inferior) performers. Initially, we rank stocks based on their (ex-post) 
performance after the calendar quarter in which a mutual fund conducts its trades. These 
rankings are used to assign each fund’s stocks to several “performance” buckets. Then, we 
employ regression analysis to determine which funds select stocks correctly by acquiring future 
better performers and/or disposing of future poorer performers and which funds exhibit perverse 
selectivity by buying future poor performers and/or selling future better performers.7
                                                 
6We use the sentiment index based on the first principal components of six nonorthogonalized sentiment proxies that 
is made available on Jeffrey Wurgler’s website: http:www.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler. These index series initially 
ended in 2005, and our study concludes accordingly. 
 
7Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) caution against the use of quarterly mutual fund holdings since 
approximately 20% of the within-quarter transactions are omitted. We recognize this limitation but balance sample 
size with frequency of observation. For example, Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) have 215 funds 
and 6,432 fund-months in the period 1994–2005 as compared to our study with 2,173 funds and 27,349 fund-
quarters in the period 1991–2005. 
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To examine the possibility that selectivity may relate to how fund managers adjust their 
sentiment beta ahead of anticipated changes in sentiment, we require stock sentiment betas. We 
calculate these by employing the procedure traditionally used to generate market betas, but 
substitute Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) nonorthogonalized monthly sentiment changes index for 
market return. Thereafter, fund portfolio holdings are ranked according to the stocks’ sentiment 
betas, and preferences in trading are identified using the same procedure used to gauge 
selectivity. Once determined, we relate the preferences exhibited by fund managers in trading 
stocks according to sentiment betas to their trades that exhibit selectivity. Next, we consider the 
effect of Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) definition of stock-picking versus timing behavior on 
our relation between timing and selectivity, and finally identify fund managers that exhibit skill 
in their stock selection. 
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample contains 2173 distinct mutual funds and 27,349 fund-quarters that meet our 
selection and data quality criteria. Panel A of Table I presents the distribution of fund market 
capitalization and number of stocks in each fund. The skewed distributions reflect a few very 
large funds and a small number of funds holding a large number of stocks. Panel B presents the 
number of funds for which we are able to calculate selectivity betas that are represented in our 




III. Selectivity and Sentiment 
A. Identifying Selectivity in Trades 
Evaluating the stock selection skill of a fund manager by focusing on fund performance is 
confounded by the appropriateness of the benchmark and the impact of the extant portfolio.8
Grinblatt and Titman (1993) use quarterly holdings to create zero-investment portfolios 
that comprise the assets in the funds’ portfolios reported at the beginning of each period held 
long, while shorting the assets held in the previous period. Since the portfolio has zero 
investment, any return will reveal selectivity; however, a number of fund-quarters need to be 
examined before it is possible to conclude statistical significance of this return. Chen, Jegadeesh, 
and Wermers (2000) also focus on fund trades to assess stock selection ability, but only as an 
aggregate of trades across mutual funds. Stocks are ranked according to the level of trading by 
mutual funds, and those more commonly bought by mutual funds have significantly higher 
 To 
avoid these complications, Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers 
(2000) employ methods that avoid the use of benchmarks and focus on the trades of fund 
managers. However, while they conclude that selectivity exists in mutual funds, their methods do 
not permit statistical identification of particular funds that are selective in a particular quarter.  
                                                 
8For example, Carhart (1997) finds that persistence of fund performance can be largely explained by price 
momentum in the stocks that a fund holds. Persistence is also partly explained by factors such as portfolio turnover 
and costs per transaction (for funds holding less-liquid stocks), which increase costs and reduce net performance. 
 
 13 
returns than those sold. The level of mutual fund trading in a stock is determined from the 
change in the aggregate proportion of fund ownership of a stock from one period to the next.  
Similar to Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000), our 
procedure examines stock selection by fund managers by focusing on mutual fund trades.9
An alternative measure of stock selectivity is provided by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). 
They measure selectivity by the deviation of a fund’s portfolio from an index and refer to this as 
“Active Share.” Lower commonality with the index indicates that fund managers are engaging in 
stock selection. However, their method concentrates on stock holdings and ignores the trades 
conducted by fund managers. Another measure of deviation from benchmark portfolios using the 
R-square of fund returns is proposed by Amihud and Goyenko (2012). Both measures do not 
distinguish good stock selection from bad and both are less direct than the procedure we employ. 
 
However, unlike these studies, our method is able to test—with statistical confidence—whether 
managers exhibit superior stock selection in any calendar quarter on a fund-by-fund basis.  
In our procedure, the stocks held by each mutual fund at the beginning of each calendar 
quarter are ranked according to their performance over the three months following the end of the 
quarter. Adapting the method in Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010), we assign the 
performance-ranked stocks to twenty equal-value buckets. Then, we derive a measure of each 
bucket’s future return performance by value-weighting the performance (Bucket_Performance) 
                                                 
9We acknowledge that the decision to hold a stock affects a fund’s performance. However, as Kothari and Warner 
(2001) indicate, the decision to trade a stock is also more likely to reflect information regarding its investment 
potential than the decision to hold the stock. 
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of each stock in the bucket. Bucket_Performance is used as the independent variable in our 
regression. Like Cullen, Gasbarro, and Monroe (2010), we use “TradeValue”—the value of 
stocks in each bucket in a fund’s portfolio that are traded during a quarter—as the dependent 
variable. Stock purchases are assigned a positive value, and stock sales a negative value. 
Therefore, the regressions that we perform for each of the 27,349 fund-quarters are described 
below: 
)1(ePerformancBucket_TradeValue jjj εβα ++=  
where 
j.bucket in  stocks ofnumber   n
and; 1quarter tin  istock  of ePerformanc ePerformanc
quarter t; ofstart  at the held istock  of valueheldstock Value



































Significantly negative or positive coefficients on “Bucket_Performance” indicate funds 
where trading is selective with respect to future stock performance. We refer to these coefficients 
as selectivity trade betas; a positive beta indicates that in a fund-quarter, stocks with high future 
returns are being purchased and stocks with poor future returns are being sold. Conversely, a 
negative selectivity trade beta identifies portfolio adjustments that are systematically perverse. 
This follows since, by construction, there was no initial relation between the value of stock in 
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bucketj and the buckets’ future performance. The statistical significance of the number of 
selectivity trade betas obtained from repeat regressions is established by comparison with critical 
values from the cumulative binomial distribution. 
We perform the preceding analysis with three variations. In the first, we calculate 
“TradeValuej” by including both the buy and sell trades in a quarter and refer to the coefficient in 
Equation (1) as the “net” selectivity trade beta. In the second, we include only buy trades, while 
in the third we include only sell trades. We refer to the regression coefficients for these as “buy” 
selectivity and “sell” selectivity trade betas respectively. By separating trades into buys and sells, 
we can obtain an insight into whether fund managers make the correct selection with respect to 
the stocks they buy and those they sell, in addition to whether they make the correct combined 
(net) selection of stocks to trade. 
In summary, we use Equation (1) to perform 27,349 univariate linear regressions to 
identify fund-quarters where there is a relation between future stock performance and proportion 
of stocks traded by a fund. A statistically positive net selectivity trade beta indicates that 
adjustments to a fund’s portfolio during a quarter are consistent with fund managers exhibiting 
selectivity by acquiring stocks that are destined to become better performers, while disposing of 
stocks that are subsequently poor performers. A negative net selectivity trade beta identifies 
funds with perverse selectivity, where managers purchase stocks that subsequently underperform 
or sell stocks that subsequently outperform, or both. 
Panel A of Table II reports the pooled count for net selectivity, buy selectivity, and sell 
selectivity over the 15-year period for the 10 percent significance level (two-tailed). Using the 
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binomial distribution, we are able to determine that the frequency of both positive and negative 
net selectivity trade betas exceed that expected by random occurrence with 99 percent statistical 
confidence. The frequency of positive betas (9.5%) suggests that some fund managers are able to 
identify the correct stocks to buy and sell (good selectivity). However, the higher-than-random 
incidences of negative betas (9.3%) indicate that some managers have a propensity to trade 
stocks imprudently (bad selectivity). It should be noted that while we find that 9.5 percent of 
funds exhibit good selectivity, 5 percent are expected to do so randomly. Therefore, we are able 
to conclude, with statistical confidence, that some fund managers exhibit skill in stock selection, 
but are unable to state which fund managers who exhibit selectivity did so from skill.10
Examining selectivity with respect to stocks purchased (buy selectivity) and stocks sold 
(sell selectivity), separately, reveals incidences of good and bad selectivity that are largely 
similar to the incidences of net selectivity. However, relative to bad buy selectivity (7.7%), the 




 Relative to good sell 
selectivity (8.5%), the frequency of bad sell selectivity (9.5%) is higher (Z = 3.82). These results 
suggest that more fund managers are able to correctly select stocks to buy, but more make errors 
in selling stocks that subsequently outperform those they retain.  
                                                 
10In Section IV, we propose a method to distinguish skill from luck. 
11The statistical significance of this difference is established using the Z-test for dependent proportions. Throughout 
the discussion that follows, we cite Z-statistics for differences in dependent proportions or for the difference in a 
proportion from its expected (e.g., full time-series) value, as appropriate. 
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B. Identifying Sentiment-based Trades 
We use Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) (BW07) nonorthogonalized monthly “sentiment 
changes” index to calculate sentiment betas for each stock. This index is used as the independent 
variable in a time-series regression analogous to that used for calculating the traditional market 
beta. As with the market beta, the stock’s returns over the previous 60 months12
Panel B shows that the proportions of negative and positive sentiment trade betas are both 
significantly greater than the expected random occurrence of five percent. This indicates that at 
 are used as the 
dependent variable. Having determined stock sentiment betas, we adapt the procedure described 
in Equation (1) in the previous section to determine whether, in a particular quarter, a fund’s 
trades exhibit preference for stocks according to their sentiment beta. The adaption involves 
ranking stocks held and acquired by a fund by the stocks’ sentiment betas rather than by the 
stock’s future performances. Equation (1) is altered by replacing “performance” with “sentiment 
beta,” while “Bucket_Performance” is replaced by “Bucket_Sentiment_Beta.” As before, 27,349 
regressions are performed—one for each fund-quarter—and those with statistically significant 
“sentiment trade betas” are identified. A positive sentiment trade beta indicates that adjustments 
to a fund’s portfolio during a quarter are consistent with the acquisition of high sentiment beta 
stocks and/or selling low sentiment beta stocks by fund managers. A negative sentiment trade 
beta indicates that managers are reducing the weighted average sentiment beta of their stock 
portfolio by doing the opposite. 
                                                 
12 We eliminate stocks that do not have a minimum of 12 months of returns.  
 18 
various times, fund managers conduct trades designed to either increase or decrease the 
sentiment beta of their portfolio. 
 
C. Selectivity with Change in Investor Sentiment 
Investor sentiment varies over time. If the mispricing of stocks varies according to the 
level of investor sentiment, then the opportunity for mutual funds to exhibit selectivity should be 
greatest when sentiment is high, and mispricing is greatest (the mispricing hypothesis). 
Alternatively, if fund managers attempt to predict investor sentiment and trade stocks according 
to their expected performance, higher levels of good and bad selectivity would be observed prior 
to large increases or decreases in sentiment. More fund managers that make successful 
predictions would exhibit good selectivity, whereas more that make unsuccessful predictions 
would exhibit poor selectivity (the sentiment prediction hypothesis). Moreover, if investor 
sentiment is mean-reverting, then more fund managers that decrease (increase) their sentiment 
beta when investor sentiment is high (low) would exhibit better selectivity; more fund managers 
that make the opposite adjustments would exhibit poor selectivity. 
We measure the level of investor sentiment by averaging the BW07 monthly sentiment 
index at the beginning of each month during the calendar quarter for which we examine fund 
trades. To measure the change in investor sentiment over the quarter following the trading 
period, we average the monthly values of the BW07 sentiment changes index during this quarter. 
We rank fund-quarters using the average sentiment index and allocate fund-quarters to 
approximate quintiles and then repeat this process using the average sentiment changes index. 
 19 
Table III presents the percentage of net, buy, and sell selectivity trade betas for each quintile that 
are significantly positive or negative. 
[Table III] 
Quintile 5 in Panel A of Table III presents fund-quarters from the intervals in which 
investor sentiment was highest. Inconsistent with the mispricing hypothesis, when investor 
sentiment is high, the proportion of funds exhibiting bad selectivity (12.4%) statistically exceeds 
the proportion exhibiting good selectivity (9.1%, Z = 5.29). Moreover, the proportion of funds 
exhibiting bad selectivity in this quintile statistically exceeds the proportion exhibiting bad 
selectivity (9.3%, Z = 7.92) for the entire time-series in Table II. It is also apparent that the 
increased proportion of funds exhibiting bad selectivity arises both from fund managers 
incorrectly choosing stocks to buy (10.4%) and incorrectly choosing stocks to sell (11.1%). 
When sentiment is low, quintile 1 shows that the proportion of funds exhibiting good selection 
(8.1%) marginally exceeds the proportion exhibiting bad selection (7.2%, Z = 1.70). However, 
both are marginally below the proportions (9.3%, Z = 3.53 and 9.5%, Z = 5.34) for the full time-
series in Table II. From the components of net selectivity it is apparent that as a group, mutual 
fund managers find it easier to avoid buying the wrong stocks, but more difficult to identify the 
correct stocks to sell. When sentiment is low, statistically fewer fund managers (4.9%, Z = 9.02) 
incorrectly choose stocks to buy, while the reduced good selectivity arises from statistically 
fewer fund managers (5.5%, Z = 8.33) able to identify the correct stocks to sell. 
When considering actual changes in investor sentiment that are identified ex-post, the 
pattern of good buy selectivity and bad sell selectivity identified in quintile 1 of Panel A is 
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repeated in intervals of extreme sentiment increase in quintile 5 of Panel B. Buy selectivity is 
greatest, featuring reduced bad selectivity (5.4%) and elevated good selectivity (13.5%). Both 
proportions differ significantly from the proportions for the full time-series in Table II (7.7%, Z 
= 6.33 and 9.0%, Z = 11.53 respectively), as well as from each other (Z = 13.90). Sell selectivity 
is least, with reduced good (7.2%) and elevated bad (12.7%) selectivity. Notably, the reverse is 
observed in quintile 1 for extreme sentiment decreases. Buy selectivity is least, showing elevated 
bad selectivity (13.5%) and reduced good selectivity (7.7%), while sell selectivity is greatest 
showing reduced bad selectivity (8.5%) and elevated good selectivity (12.7%). The proportions 
of good and bad selectivity differ statistically (Z = 9.31 and Z = 6.72) for each of buy and sell 
selectivity, and from the proportions in Table II (Z = 15.95, Z = 3.33, Z = 2.50, and Z = 11.04). 
Both buy and sell selectivity contribute to the overall measure of net selectivity, and the elevated 
instances of both bad and good net selectivity precede the largest increases or decreases in 
sentiment. We interpret these findings as indicating that preceding an increase in investor 
sentiment, as a group, fund managers find it easier to identify which stocks to buy, but more 
difficult to choose the right stocks to sell. Conversely, preceding a decrease, fund managers find 
it easier to identify the correct stocks to sell, but more difficult to choose the right ones to buy. 
 
D. Selectivity by Changing Fund Sentiment Betas to Time Investor Sentiment  
The preceding analysis indicates that, as a group, mutual fund selectivity is not enhanced 
when sentiment is high. Therefore, as a group, mutual fund selectivity does not conform to the 
mispricing hypothesis. However, there is some evidence that selectivity, good and bad, varies 
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according to changes in investor sentiment over the calendar quarter following stock selection 
(the trading period), particularly when the components, buy and sell selectivity, are examined. 
To further explore the sentiment prediction hypothesis, we consider the subset of mutual fund 
managers that either increase or decrease their sentiment beta during the trading period to assess 
the prevalence of good and bad selectivity in these groups.  
A stock’s sentiment beta indicates a stock’s price response to changing investor 
sentiment. On average, when investor sentiment increases, stocks with high sentiment betas 
outperform stocks with low sentiment betas. Conversely, when investor sentiment decreases, on 
average, stocks with low sentiment betas outperform stocks with high sentiment betas. If fund 
managers attempt to predict sentiment and trade accordingly, those that buy (sell) stocks with 
high sentiment betas and/or sell (buy) stocks with low sentiment betas ahead of increasing 
sentiment would more commonly exhibit good (bad) selectivity. Alternatively, fund managers 
that buy (sell) stocks with low sentiment betas and/or sell (buy) stocks with high sentiment betas 
ahead of decreasing sentiment would more commonly exhibit good (bad) selectivity. These 
permutations are summarized in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1] 
We identify, with statistical significance, fund managers who trade to decrease or 
increase their sentiment beta, and cross-tabulate the proportion we identify as exhibiting bad or 
good selectivity for various market conditions (sentiment tertiles) in Table IV. In Panel A, the 
market conditions are the tertiles of the BW07 sentiment changes index in the calendar quarter 
following trading, and in Panel B, the market conditions are the average of the start-of-month 
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values of BW07’s sentiment index over the trading period. Only the highest and lowest tertiles 
are reported. Consistent with Figure 1, Panel A of Table IV shows that more fund managers that 
decrease their sentiment beta ahead of falling investor sentiment exhibit good net selectivity 
(24.3%) and fewer exhibit bad selectivity (4.9%).These proportions are significantly different 
from each other (Z = 12.14) and, respectively, above (Z = 15.93) and below (Z = 4.78) the 
corresponding proportions for the entire time-series in Table II. Of the fund managers that 
increase their sentiment beta ahead of rising investor sentiment, a significantly greater proportion 
(Z = 11.35) exhibit good net selectivity (21.3%) and a lesser proportion exhibit bad selectivity 
(5.4%). Furthermore, consistent with Figure 1, of the fund managers that alter their sentiment 
beta in the opposite direction to the subsequent change in investor sentiment, there is an 
increased incidence of bad selectivity and decreased incidence of good selectivity. 
[Table IV] 
An examination of buy and sell selectivity in Panel A of Table IV shows that sell 
selectivity, both bad and good, drives net selectivity when fund managers trade to reduce their 
sentiment beta, while good and bad buy selectivity drives net selectivity when fund managers 
trade to increase their sentiment beta. It follows that selectivity relates most strongly to the trades 
that involve high sentiment beta stocks, that is—and as Figure 1 demonstrates—where sentiment 
beta is decreased by selling high sentiment beta stocks and increased by buy buying high 
sentiment beta stocks.  
The above results support the sentiment prediction hypothesis to the extent that of the 
fund managers that trade to alter their sentiment beta in the same direction as the subsequent 
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change in investor sentiment, more exhibit good selectivity. However, the actual change in 
investor sentiment is only known ex-post; it remains unclear whether selectivity relates to trading 
to alter a fund’s sentiment beta according to the level of sentiment during the calendar quarter 
that trading occurs. Panel B of Table IV displays a similar pattern of buy and sell selectivity to 
that in Panel A where the sentiment tertile “rise” is replaced with “low” and “fall” is replaced 
with “high.” Net selectivity also follows the same pattern except where sentiment beta is 
decreased during a low sentiment period and is not associated with elevated bad selection, as is 
the case with sell selectivity. Although the differences between the proportions of fund managers 
exhibiting good or bad selectivity are not as marked in Panel B as in Panel A, it remains the case 
that, compared to the entire sample in Table II, statistically more fund managers that buy high 
sentiment beta stocks when sentiment is low (13.3%, Z = 4.97) or sell high sentiment stocks 
when sentiment is high (15.7%, Z = 8.34) exhibit greater selectivity. We conclude that, 
consistent with the sentiment prediction hypothesis, mutual fund managers could improve their 
selectivity by conducting trades based on stock sentiment betas given the level of investor 
sentiment when they trade. However, while some fund managers conduct appropriate sentiment-
based trades, others are either over-optimistic or over-pessimistic and adjust their sentiment beta 
in the wrong direction to benefit. 
We further examine the relation between selectivity, trading to alter sentiment beta, and 










where SelectivityTradeBetajt represent the signed statistically significant “β” coefficients 
estimated using Equation (1) for each fund j in quarter t when stocks are ranked on prior 
performance, SentimentTradeBetajt represent the signed statistically significant “β” coefficients 
when stocks are ranked on stock sentiment beta, L13mSI is the one-month lagged moving three-
month average of BW07 nonorthogonalized monthly investor sentiment index, and SChIt-1 
represents the three-month averages of BW07 nonorthogonalized monthly investor sentiment 
changes index. 
Model (1) in Table V shows the parameter estimates for Equation (2) when we include 
only the information regarding investor sentiment that is available at the time that fund managers 
conduct their trades. SentimentTradeBeta takes on the value of 1 if, with statistical significance, 
a fund manager trades to increase sentiment beta and -1 if a fund manager trades to decrease 
sentiment beta. Accordingly, we interpret the statistically negative coefficient b1 as confirming 
the result in Panel B of Table IV—that increasing (decreasing) sentiment beta when sentiment is 
low (high) improves selectivity. The significantly positive coefficient b2 indicates that increasing 
(decreasing) sentiment beta while sentiment is increasing (decreasing) also improves selectivity. 
The model correctly predicts 65.3 percent of instances of observations of good and bad 
selectivity, with pseudo r-squares of 3.5% and 4.7%. 
[Table V] 
Model (2) demonstrates that selectivity is very strongly dependent on whether a fund 
manager trades to increase or decrease sentiment beta ahead of a change in investor sentiment. 
Consistent with Model (1), the coefficient b2 remains statistically positive, and consistent with 
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Panel A of Table IV, the coefficient b3 is also statistically positive. The model correctly predicts 
76.4 percent of instances of observations of good and bad selectivity, with pseudo r-squares of 
31.5% and 42%. Therefore, fund managers would be able to improve the likelihood of exhibiting 
good selectivity if they can predict a decrease in investor sentiment and reduce their sentiment 
beta in anticipation, or can predict an increase and increase their sentiment beta. 
We have shown that the proportion of fund managers that exhibit bad or good selectivity 
exceeds random expectation. Of the fund managers we identify as exhibiting good (bad) 
selectivity, some will have done so by good (bad) luck and some by skill (perverse skill). We 
have also shown that the proportions also depend on how fund trades adjust their sentiment beta 
ahead of changes in investor sentiment. However, the actual changes in sentiment are only 
known ex-post, and it remains ambiguous whether fund managers correctly (incorrectly) adjust 
their sentiment beta from skill (perverse skill) in predicting investor sentiment. We consider the 
question of luck or skill in Section IV. 
 
E. Selectivity, Active Share, and Tracking Error Variance 
According to Cremers and Petajisto (2009), managers can only outperform their 
benchmarks by deviating from them, by either attempting to identify mispriced stocks or making 
factor bets. They proxy attempts to identify mispriced stocks with “Active Share” and factor bets 
by tracking error variance. In this context, timing investor sentiment may be viewed as a factor 
bet. However, Cremers and Petajisto (2009) find that higher fund returns are more closely 
associated with Active Share than with tracking error variance, whereas the evidence presented 
 26 
in the previous section suggests that selectivity is primarily related to market timing. However, 
as we are able to distinguish good from bad stock selection and directly identify market timing, 
we partition the results from Tables III and IV into the four quadrants of high and low Active 
Share and high and low tracking error variance to reconcile these findings. 
Accordingly, in Table VI, we partition fund-quarters of significant selectivity trade betas 
into the four quadrants of high and low Active Share and high and low tracking error variance 
using data made available on Antti Petajisto’s website: www.petjisto.net/data.html. In Panel A, 
we sort by Active Share, then by tracking error variance; in Panel B we do the reverse. We find 
that fund-quarters with high Active Share and low tracking error variance—classified by 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009) as “diversified stock pickers”—do not exhibit elevated levels of 
selectivity, good or bad, in either panel. However, fund-quarters with low Active Share and high 
tracking error variance—classified as “factor bets”—exhibit higher incidences of both good and 
bad selectivity. This pattern is observed with respect to net, buy, and sell selectivity and is also 
apparent in Table VII where the traditional measure of tracking error variance used by Chevalier 
and Ellison (1997) is employed. These results are consistent with tracking error variance being a 
proxy for factor timing, with the higher incidence of bad selectivity being explained by failed 
factor bets. However, our results do not support the contention that greater deviation from the 
composition of index portfolios is, in itself, a proxy for stock selection ability. 
[Tables VI and VII] 
We repeat the analysis presented in Table IV in which we examine the relation between 
trading to alter a fund’s sentiment beta and the market conditions of high or low investor 
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sentiment and increasing or decreasing sentiment. In this instance, we partition the sample into 
quadrants of high or low Active Share and high or low tracking error variance; Table VIII 
presents the results. For Panels A to D, we create the quadrants by first sorting by Active Share 
and then tracking error variance, while in Panels E to H we do the reverse. In Cremers and 
Petajisto’s (2009) parlance, Panels B and F are “diversified stock pickers,” while Panels C and G 
are “factor timers.” The pattern predicted in Figure 1 and observed in Panel A of Table IV, 
where fund managers who trade to increase (decrease) their sentiment beta exhibit good (bad) 
selectivity if investor sentiment subsequently increases and the reverse when sentiment 
decreases, is observed in columns 2–5 of all panels of Table VIII. Notably, the pattern is most 
pronounced for funds with low Active Share and high tracking error variance—the factor timers. 
Diversified stock pickers, with high Active Share and low tracking error variance, exhibit a less 
pronounced relation between selectivity and the interaction of trading that alters sentiment beta 
with investor sentiment. However, it is apparent that even “diversified stock pickers” appear to 
time the market. This result confirms the findings in Tables VI and VII that both good and bad 
selectivity is greater for funds with high tracking error variance and that, consistent with factor 
timing behavior, the source of this increased incidence is trading to alter fund sentiment betas. 
Curiously, for “closet indexers” with low Active Share and low tracking error variance, the 
number of fund managers exhibiting poor selectivity when they increase their sentiment beta 
ahead of a fall in sentiment, is elevated. 
[Table VIII] 
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Columns 6–9 of Table VIII show that when sentiment is high, poor selectivity is the 
hallmark of fund managers with low Active Share when they trade to increase their sentiment 
beta. For “closet indexers,” more than 45 percent of fund managers tilt their portfolio toward 
stocks that subsequently underperform. This result strongly suggests that even “closet indexers” 
engage in market timing, but are generally unsuccessful as a group. However, from the number 
of fund-quarters in column 7, it appears that the tracking error variances obtained from Antti 
Petajisto’s website may be correlated with investor sentiment. A greater number of fund-quarters 
are classified as having low (high) tracking error variance when investor sentiment is low (high). 
It is possible that this result arises because Cremers and Petajisto (2009) measure tracking error 
variance as the variance of the residuals from a regression of fund returns on the benchmark 
index. The regression uses the relatively short interval of six months of daily returns, which may 
fall largely into periods of high or low investor sentiment. It is likely that the benchmark index 
correlates with investor sentiment and, consequently, produces an association between the 
variance of the regression residuals and investor sentiment. Moreover, as Petajisto (2010) 
cautions, if fund managers time the market by holding cash, for example, this may increase 
tracking error variance without affecting the regression residuals. 
Table IX repeats the analysis shown in Table VIII, but uses Chevalier and Ellison’s (1997) 
measure of tracking error variance. The results are largely similar, but with two notable 
exceptions. First, the number of fund-quarters (column 7) falling into high or low sentiment 
periods is more balanced. Second, the frequency of poor selectivity exhibited by “closet 
indexers” who increase their sentiment beta ahead of a fall, or when sentiment is high, is not 
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increased to the same degree. Accordingly, we conclude that successful and unsuccessful timing 
of investor sentiment is a pervasive characteristic of fund management, albeit more prevalent in 
funds with higher tracking error variances. 
[Table IX] 
 
IV. Distinguishing Skill from Luck 
In any given quarter, a fund manager may exhibit superior stock selection by chance 
rather than skill. However, skill may be identified if superior selection is persistent. Grinblatt and 
Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) examine persistence using return performance as the measure 
of selection ability. This measure has limitations arising from the choice of benchmarks and 
effect of the extant portfolio that are the focus in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) 
and Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000). Nonetheless, the use of performance as the 
measurement of selectivity requires the creation of portfolios of funds to increase the power of 
statistical tests13
                                                 
13 The statistical significance of performance is addressed using bootstrapping techniques in studies by Kosowski, 
Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006), Cuthbertson, Nitzche, and O’Sullivan (2008), and Fama and French 
(2010). 
 before out-performance can be concluded. Consequently, these studies 
principally base their conclusions on portfolios rather than individual funds. Moreover, as 
previously argued, while improved performance is the objective of good stock selection, 
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performance14
We interpret fund-quarters with significantly positive selectivity betas as exhibiting good 
stock selection. However, as a consequence of our 90 percent (two-tailed) confidence 
requirement, fund managers executing purely random trades would exhibit good (or bad) stock 
selection with a five percent probability. If the board of directors’ goal is to reward skillful 
managers and dismiss poor managers, it is necessary to distinguish luck from skill. We 
statistically separate skill from luck by considering a fund manager’s selectivity performance 
over several quarters and using the cumulative binomial probability distribution with a 99 
percent confidence interval. For a particular fund, we conclude that a manager has skill by using 
the number of quarters as the number of trials, the number of quarters in which a fund manager 
exhibits selectivity (has a statistically positive selectivity beta) as the number of successes, and 
five percent as the probability of a successful outcome. This five percent probability arises from 
the earlier regressions that identified the selection betas with 90 percent confidence. 
 alone is an indirect measure of selectivity. In contrast, our measure is not only 
direct but statistically identifies selectivity fund-by-fund; therefore, the persistence in this 
selectivity can be used fund-by-fund to distinguish, with statistical confidence, skill from luck. 
Panels A and B of Table X show the number of funds that we classify the managers as 
exhibiting good (bad) skill from repeated positive (negative) selectivity. In Panel A, various 
ranges of the number of quarters for which a fund enters our dataset correspond to the minimum 
number of quarters that a fund in that range must exhibit (net) selectivity to be considered 
                                                 
14In separate tests, we confirm that, on average, funds that exhibit good selectivity outperform those that our 
measure classifies as exhibiting bad selectivity. However, there is substantial overlap in these distributions. 
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skillful. Because our dataset holds fewer funds with longer records, the number of funds varies 
accordingly. For example, in our dataset, 557 funds have between 4 and 9 (inclusive) quarters of 
data, and the cumulative binomial probability distribution requires a minimum of 2 quarters of 
positive stock selection before we classify 83 funds as having good stock selection skill. In 
aggregate, 1,697 funds in our dataset appear 4 or more times, and we classify the managers of 
255 (228) funds as having good (bad) net stock selection skill. Similar to the final row in Panel 
A, in Panel B, we report the number of funds exhibiting bad or good stock selection skill, but 
consider net, buy, and sell selectivity. 
[Table X] 
The analyses we report in Panels A and B of Table X allow us to identify the managers of 
255 funds as having good stock selection ability, with 99 percent statistical confidence. 
However, for our method to be practically useful for evaluating a fund manager’s stock selection 
skill, a suitable evaluation period may be one calendar year. Consistent with the preceding 
discussion, to classify a fund manager as skillful, an evaluation period of four quarters requires a 
fund to exhibit selectivity two or more times. Accordingly, in Panel C we identify 3,034 fund-
years where funds have four consecutive quarters of data that comprise a calendar year. Note that 
some funds may have more than one calendar year of data, while some funds will not have four 
contiguous quarters of data that comprise a calendar year. We observe 131 fund-years where we 
can conclude that fund managers possess stock (net) selection skill with 99 percent statistical 
confidence. Of further interest, we report that over our 15-year sample period, we identify two 
funds where the managers demonstrate good selection skill in three calendar years and another 
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five in two calendar years. Fourteen funds demonstrate bad selection skill over two calendar 
years and two over three years. 
 
V. Conclusion 
By examining changes to mutual fund portfolio holdings, we statistically identify fund 
managers who, in a calendar quarter, realign their portfolios by buying the stocks that 
subsequently became better performers while selling stocks that became poorer performers. We 
refer to this realignment as good selectivity and find that it is achieved by more fund managers 
than would be expected from random occurrence. However, fund managers exhibit bad 
selectivity in a similar number of fund-quarters. Unlike good selectivity that may be rationalized 
as the outcome of trades by skilled managers focused on improving a fund’s return performance, 
bad selectivity is unlikely to be an objective. Moreover, bad luck can only partially explain the 
prevalence of fund managers who exhibit bad selectivity in the stocks they trade. 
The sensitivity of a stock’s returns to changing investor sentiment affects the stock’s relative 
performance. On average, stocks with high sentiment betas perform relatively better (worse) 
when investor sentiment increases (decreases). This raises the possibility that the elevated 
incidences of good and bad selectivity may relate to the differing abilities of funds to predict 
changes in investor sentiment. Funds that trade stocks to effect an appropriate change in their 
portfolio’s sentiment beta ahead of a change in sentiment would exhibit better selectivity. In 
traditional parlance, this may be described as “timing” market sentiment. Consistent with the 
sentiment prediction hypothesis, we find that a larger proportion of fund managers who buy 
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stocks with high sentiment betas exhibit good selectivity when they do so ahead of an increase in 
investor sentiment. Ahead of a decrease, more fund managers who sell high sentiment beta 
stocks exhibit good selectivity. Fund managers who conduct the opposite trades in high 
sentiment beta stocks exhibit bad selectivity.  
Selectivity that stems from timing investor sentiment is possible if fund managers can 
predict changes in sentiment. However, we also find that selectivity is demonstrated by fund 
managers that make sentiment-based trades according to the level and change in investor 
sentiment at the time the trades are being executed. In support of the mispricing hypothesis, an 
increased proportion exhibit good selectivity when fund managers sell high sentiment beta stocks 
when sentiment is high and buy high sentiment stocks when sentiment is low. In addition, more 
exhibit good selectivity when the fund’s sentiment beta is adjusted in the same direction as the 
contemporaneous change in investor sentiment. That is, the likelihood of a fund manager 
executing trades that tilt the portfolio toward stocks that become the better performers is 
improved if the trades are based on sentiment beta and information on investor sentiment that is 
available at the time of trading. 
We consider the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) attributes of Active Share as a proxy for stock 
picking, and tracking error variance as a proxy for factor timing. Their focus on deviations from 
benchmark portfolios precludes identification of good and bad selectivity or timing, which our 
method is able to discern. Our results suggest that fund managers attempt to time investor 
sentiment with varying success, irrespective of the divisions made by Cremers and Petajisto 
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(2009). However, we found support for their conjecture that tracking error variances proxies 
market timing from the elevated incidence of timing behavior in this group.  
When a fund’s trading behavior is examined over time, it becomes possible to distinguish 
genuine stock selection skill from fortuitous selection of the correct stocks to buy or sell. We 
used this to develop a practical method to evaluate the stock selection ability of a particular fund 
manager, with 99 percent statistical confidence. We conclude that mutual fund managers can 
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Figure I. Summary of how selectivity reflects trades that change sentiment beta prior to changes in investor 
sentiment.  
The figure shows how the change in investor sentiment (SChI) during the appraisal period differentially affects the 
apparent selectivity of mutual funds that have traded to alter their sentiment beta (Sbeta) in the preceding period. For 
example, the first row shows that during the trading period, funds that either buy high sentiment beta stocks, sell low 
sentiment beta stocks, or both, increase their sentiment beta (positive SentimentTradeBeta) such that if in the 
subsequent period investor sentiment increases, they will appear to have tilted their portfolio toward the better 





Descriptive Statistics, 1991–2005 
 
Fund-quarter sentiment betas are a weighted average of the stock sentiment betas held 
by a fund at the beginning of a quarter. Selectivity betas are the coefficients (β) from 
repeated regressions of jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= .  
Panel B presents the number of funds with associated number of quarters that permit 
this regression. For example, a fund with six quarters of data will be counted in the 
column headed “4–7.” 
Panel A: Fund Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of fund-quarters 27,349   
Number of funds 2,173   
Market capitalization ($ million) 1,043 234 3,840 
Number of stocks in portfolio 154 93 239 
Fund-quarter sentiment beta 0.0199 0.0172 0.0159 
Panel B: Funds with selectivity betas calculated over time 
Number of quarters <4 4–7 8–11 12–19 20–39 40+ 





Significant Selectivity Betas, 1991–2005 
 
The number of statistically significant selectivity betas is generated from linear regressions 
of jjj εβα ++=  formanceBucket_PerTradeValue , where 
j.bucket in  stocks ofnumber   n
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The number of statistically significant sentiment trade betas is generated from the same 
formula; however, “Performance” is replaced by “Sentiment_beta”. The cumulative 
binomial distribution critical values (Bin CV) reflect a one percent probability that a 
lower (Min) or greater (Max) count occurs by chance. All percentages are significant at 
the one percent level. 
   Trade Betas 
 N Binomial CV 
Range 
Negative Positive 




Panel A: Selectivity Trade Betas 
Net 27,349 1,283 1,452 2,530 9.3% 2,588 9.5% 
Buy 27,349 1,283 1,452 2,095 7.7% 2,468 9.0% 
Sell 27,349 1,283 1,452 2,594 9.5% 2,326 8.5% 
Panel B: Sentiment Trade Betas 
Sentiment Trade Beta 27,349 1,283 1,452 2,717 9.9% 3,645 13.3% 








Time-Series Variation of Significant Selectivity Betas, 1991–2005 
 
Fund-quarters are ranked by the average of the three beginning-of-month values of the sentiment 
index (Panel A) during and sentiment changes index (Panel B) following the quarters for which 
we examine fund trades, before the time-series are partitioned and fund-quarters allocated to 
quintiles. For each quintile, the proportion of selectivity betas generated from the regression 
jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= for each fund-quarter that are statistically negative 
or positive is calculated. Trade value is the value of the net, buy, and sell trades during a quarter 
in each performance bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 
  Net Selectivity Buy Selectivity Sell Selectivity 
Quintile N Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Panel A: Average Sentiment Index Quintile 
1 Low 5,452 7.2% 8.1% 4.9% 9.5% 9.9% 5.5% 
2 5,588 8.7% 9.0% 5.4% 9.9% 10.7% 6.5% 
3 5,712 9.8% 10.0% 10.0% 7.0% 7.3% 11.4% 
4 5,097 8.1% 11.2% 7.6% 10.2% 8.4% 10.1% 
5 High 5,500 12.4% 9.1% 10.4% 8.6% 11.1% 9.0% 
Panel B: Change Sentiment Index Quintile 
1 Decrease 5,492 12.8% 11.2% 13.5% 7.7% 8.5% 12.7% 
2 5,414 9.3% 7.6% 7.6% 7.4% 9.5% 8.4% 
3 5,529 7.1% 8.3% 5.9% 8.2% 8.0% 7.0% 
4 5,539 7.7% 8.6% 5.9% 8.7% 8.8% 7.3% 






Time-Series Variation of Significant Selectivity Betas, 1991–2005 
 
Fund-quarters are ranked by change sentiment index (Panel A) following and average sentiment 
index (Panel B) during the quarters for which we examine fund trades, before the time-series are 
partitioned and we identify fund-quarters in the highest and lowest tertiles. Within each tertile, 
we identify fund-quarters where fund managers have (with statistical significance) traded to 
decrease or increase their sentiment beta. Within each of the four sub-groups in both Panels A 
and B, the proportion of selectivity betas generated from the regression 
jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= for each fund-quarter that are statistically negative 
or positive is calculated. Trade value is the value of the net, buy, and sell trades during a quarter 
in each performance bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 
Sentiment 
Trade 
Sentiment  Net Selectivity Buy Selectivity Sell Selectivity 
Beta Tertile N Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Panel A: Change Sentiment Index Tertile 
Decrease Rise 883 18.3% 3.9% 7.5% 5.0% 19.3% 5.3% 
Decrease Fall 996 4.9% 24.3% 5.5% 15.8% 5.5% 20.5% 
Increase Rise 1,232 5.4% 21.3% 5.0% 21.8% 6.9% 9.7% 
Increase Fall 1,375 28.8% 3.6% 26.8% 4.4% 13.7% 5.3% 
Panel B: Sentiment Index Tertile 
Decrease Low 778 7.5% 8.2% 4.1% 6.8% 12.5% 7.7% 
Decrease High 1,044 11.7% 15.9% 6.1% 10.2% 11.5% 15.7% 
Increase Low 1,094 6.1% 10.5% 6.6% 13.3% 7.7% 6.6% 






Selectivity Trade Beta 
 









where SelectivityTradeBetajt represents the signed statistically significant “β” coefficients estimated using 
Equation (1) for each fund j in period t when stocks are ranked on prior performance, 
SentimentTradeBetajt is the signed statistically significant “β” coefficients when stocks are ranked on 
stock sentiment beta, L13mSI is the one-month lagged moving three-month average of BW07 
nonorthogonalized monthly investor sentiment index, and SChIt-1 represents the three-month averages of 
BW07 nonorthogonalized monthly investor sentiment changes index. The p-values are given in 
parentheses. 
   Model  
  (1)  (2)  
Intercept -0.041 -0.091 
 (0.421) (0.151) 
Sentiment Trade Betajt x L13mSIt -0.288 0.154 
 (0.000) (0.121) 
Sentiment Trade Betajt x SChIt 0.370 0.586 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Sentiment Trade Betajt x SChIt+1  2.692 
  (0.000) 
   
Predicted Bad Good Bad Good 
Observed Bad Selectivity 591 234 666 159 
Observed Good Selectivity 322 453 150 625 
Percent correct 65.3 76.4 
Cox & Snell R2 0.035 0.315 





Significant Selectivity Betas by Active Share and Tracking Error Variance, 1991–2005 
 
This table presents the proportion of selectivity betas generated from linear regressions of
jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= , repeated “N” times, that are statistically 
negative or positive. Trade value is the value of the net, buy, and sell trades during a quarter 
in each bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 
All percentages are significant at the one percent level. 
   Net selectivity Buy selectivity Sell selectivity 
Active TEV N Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Panel A: Sorted by Active Share then by Tracking Error Variance 
Low Low 4,720 9.9% 7.8% 7.5% 9.0% 10.8% 6.4% 
High Low 4,619 7.7% 8.9% 7.3% 8.6% 8.0% 7.5% 
Low High 4,712 11.2% 10.8% 8.8% 9.6% 10.1% 9.7% 
High High 4,612 9.1% 10.4% 8.2% 9.0% 9.4% 7.0% 
Panel B: Sorted by Tracking Error Variance then by Active Share 
Low Low 4,658 10.3% 8.4% 7.6% 9.2% 11.2% 6.9% 
High Low 4,675 8.1% 8.7% 7.1% 8.7% 8.8% 7.5% 
Low High 4,665 11.2% 10.4% 9.1% 9.6% 9.5% 10.4% 









Significant Selectivity Betas by Active Share and Traditional Tracking Error Variance, 
1991–2005 
 
This table presents the proportion of selectivity betas generated from linear regressions of
jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= , repeated “N” times, that are statistically 
negative or positive. Trade value is the value of the net, buy, and sell trades during a quarter 
in each bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 
All percentages are significant at the one percent level. 
   Net selectivity Buy selectivity Sell selectivity 
Active TEV N Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive 
Panel A: Sorted by Active Share then by Tracking Error Variance 
Low Low 3,926 8.8% 9.3% 6.7% 9.9% 8.9% 7.8% 
High Low 4,543 8.6% 8.7% 7..0% 8.2% 8.7% 7.5% 
Low High 3,926 11.1% 9.5% 7.5% 8.9% 10.6% 8.6% 
High High 4,543 8.9% 10.2% 7.9% 9.1% 8.8% 9.8% 
Panel B: Sorted by Tracking Error Variance then by Active Share 
Low Low 4,240 8.8% 8.6% 6.3% 9.6% 9.7% 7.1% 
High Low 4,229 8.2% 8.9% 7.1% 8.4% 9.4% 7.4% 
Low High 4,237 11.1% 10.5% 8.0% 8.9% 9.8% 9.9% 








Time-Series Variation of Significant Net Selectivity Betas by Active Share and Tracking 
Error Variance, 1991–2005 
 
In Panels A to D, fund-quarters are first partitioned by high or low Active Share, then by high or 
low Tracking Error Variance; in Panels E to H they are partitioned by Tracking Error Variance, 
then Active Share. Fund-quarters are ranked by change sentiment index following and average 
sentiment index during the quarters for which we examine fund trades, before the time-series are 
partitioned and we identify fund-quarters in the highest and lowest tertiles. Within each tertile, we 
identify fund-quarters where funds have (with statistical significance) traded to decrease or increase 
their sentiment beta. Within each of the four sub-groups, the proportion of selectivity betas 
generated from the regression jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++= for each fund-quarter 
that are statistically negative or positive is calculated. Trade value is the value of the net trades 
during a quarter in each bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 






N Negative Positive Average 
Sentiment 
Index 
N Negative Positive 
Panel A: Low Active Share then Low Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 100 18.0% 2.0% Low 199 6.5% 4.5% 
Decrease Fall 88 5.7% 19.3% High 64 18.8% 10.9% 
Increase Rise 206 6.8% 22.8% Low 272 7.4% 10.3% 
Increase Fall 215 41.4% 2.3% High 144 47.6% 11.3% 
Panel B: High Active Share then Low Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 111 7.2% 5.4% Low 167 4.2% 8.4% 
Decrease Fall 89 3.4% 22.5% High 75 2.7% 9.3% 
Increase Rise 188 11.9% 18.9% Low 277 4.7% 10.5% 
Increase Fall 166 16.3% 6.6% High 122 7.4% 15.6% 
Panel C: Low Active Share then High Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 202 22.2% 2.5% Low 90 8.9% 15.6% 
Decrease Fall 255 3.5% 27.8% High 314 11.8% 17.8% 
Increase Rise 229 3.9% 28.8% Low 135 4.4% 10.4% 
Increase Fall 357 33.9% 2.5% High 390 27.7% 9.0% 
Panel D: High Active Share then High Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 186 21.5% 4.3% Low 69 4.3% 10.1% 
Decrease Fall 235 4.7% 23.0% High 277 14.4% 16.6% 
Increase Rise 220 6.8% 20.0% Low 84 7.1% 3.6% 
Increase Fall 246 25.6% 4.5% High 294 18.0% 11.2% 
  
 47 
Panel E: Low Tracking Error Variance then Low Active Share 
Decrease Rise 131 24.4% 3.1% Low 186 8.1% 7.0% 
Decrease Fall 120 3.3% 25.8% High 102 23.5% 16.7% 
Increase Rise 230 6.5% 23.0% Low 234 7.3% 9.8% 
Increase Fall 263 41.4% 3.0% High 203 45.9% 12.3% 
Panel F: Low Tracking Error Variance then High Active Share 
Decrease Rise 105 9.5% 3.8% Low 184 4.9% 8.7% 
Decrease Fall 77 5.2% 15.6% High 72 4.2% 8.3% 
Increase Rise 156 5.1% 17.3% Low 296 6.1% 10.1% 
Increase Fall 135 11.9% 8.1% High 105 10.5% 17.1% 
Panel G: High Tracking Error Variance then Low Active Share 
Decrease Rise 224 20.5% 4.5% Low 60 5.0% 15.0% 
Decrease Fall 277 2.9% 30.0% High 360 11.1% 17.2% 
Increase Rise 239 4.6% 28.5% Low 116 3.4% 11.2% 
Increase Fall 358 34.4% 3.4% High 400 36.1% 14.5% 
Panel H: High Tracking Error Variance then High Active Share 
Decrease Rise 139 17.3% 2.2% Low 95 4.2% 6.3% 
Decrease Fall 193 6.2% 18.7% High 196 12.2% 15.8% 
Increase Rise 218 6.4% 18.3% Low 122 4.9% 6.6% 










Time-Series Variation of Significant Net Selectivity Betas by Active Share and Traditional 
Tracking Error Variance, 1991–2005 
 
In Panels A to D, fund-quarters are partitioned first by high or low Active Share then by high or low 
Tracking Error Variance. In Panels E to H, fund-quarters are partitioned by Tracking Error Variance 
then Active Share. Fund-quarters are ranked by change sentiment index following and average 
sentiment index during the quarters for which we examine fund trades, before the time-series are 
partitioned and we identify fund-quarters in the highest and lowest tertiles. Within each tertile, we 
identify fund-quarters where fund managers have (with statistical significance) traded to decrease or 
increase their sentiment beta. Within each of the four sub-groups, the proportion of selectivity betas 
generated from the regression jjj ε formanceBucket_PerβαTradeValue ++=  for each fund-quarter 
that are statistically negative or positive is calculated. Trade value is the value of the net trades 
during a quarter in each bucket j. The cumulative binomial distribution is used to determine which 
proportions are statistically different from the five percent expected as a random occurrence. 






N Negative Positive Average 
Sentiment 
Index 
N Negative Positive 
Panel A: Low Active Share then Low Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 103 11.7% 1.0% Low 94 10.6% 5.3% 
Decrease Fall 104 2.9% 11.5% High 98 7.1% 8.2% 
Increase Rise 171 5.3% 19.9% Low 161 5.6% 11.8% 
Increase Fall 170 19.4% 5.9% High 128 18.8% 6.3% 
Panel B: High Active Share then Low Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 126 9.5% 5.6% Low 97 3.1% 7.2% 
Decrease Fall 102 2.9% 13.7% High 114 7.0% 8.8% 
Increase Rise 225 7.6% 16.9% Low 146 2.7% 13.7% 
Increase Fall 152 12.5% 5.9% High 175 7.4% 10.3% 
Panel C: Low Active Share then High Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 159 26.4% 1.3% Low 137 9.5% 9.5% 
Decrease Fall 172 5.2% 27.3% High 208 16.8% 16.8% 
Increase Rise 168 3.6% 29.8% Low 184 5.4% 10.9% 
Increase Fall 243 35.0% 1.2% High 260 27.7% 9.2% 
Panel D: High Active Share then High Tracking Error Variance 
Decrease Rise 162 21.0% 3.7% Low 133 5.3% 8.3% 
Decrease Fall 188 4.8% 23.8% High 210 15.2% 17.6% 
Increase Rise 181 3.3% 20.4% Low 200 5% 8.0% 
Increase Fall 239 24.3% 4.6% High 227 18.5% 13.2% 
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Panel E: Low Tracking Error Variance then Low Active Share 
Decrease Rise 118 16.1% 0.8% Low 125 7.2% 5.7% 
Decrease Fall 116 0.9% 14.7% High 112 12.5% 11.6% 
Increase Rise 180 4.4% 22.2% Low 197 6.1% 11.2% 
Increase Fall 200 23.0% 5.0% High 153 22.8% 5.9% 
Panel F: Low Tracking Error Variance then High Active Share 
Decrease Rise 119 10.9% 4.2% Low 79 8.9% 14.9% 
Decrease Fall 91 6.6% 14.3% High 109 7.3% 7.3% 
Increase Rise 206 7.3% 16.0% Low 132 0.8% 16.7% 
Increase Fall 141 13.5% 6.4% High 157 7% 8.9% 
Panel G: High Tracking Error Variance then Low Active Share 
Decrease Rise 189 25.9% 4.5% Low 135 8.9% 10.4% 
Decrease Fall 200 4.5% 29.0% High 244 16.8% 16.4% 
Increase Rise 192 4.2% 26.0% Low 175 5.7% 9.1% 
Increase Fall 269 33.8% 3.0% High 300 26.3% 10.0% 
Panel H: High Tracking Error Variance then High Active Share 
Decrease Rise 124 15.3% 3.2% Low 122 4.1% 5.7% 
Decrease Fall 159 5.0% 18.9% High 165 11.5% 17.6% 
Increase Rise 167 4.2% 21.6% Low 187 5.3% 8% 










Selectivity Over Multiple Calendar Quarters, 1991–2005 
 
Panel A presents the number of funds where managers exhibit bad and good skills at being 
selective. The number of quarters for which a fund appears in our dataset is used to separate 
funds before they are grouped using the minimum number of quarters (critical values) required 
for the managers of these funds to be classified as skilled. The critical values corresponding to 
99% confidence are obtained from the cumulative binomial probability distribution using the 
number of quarters as the number of observations, the number of quarters the fund exhibits 
negative or positive selectivity as the number of successes, and the probability (5%) that a fund 
is incorrectly classified as selective (negative or positive) as the probability of a success. Panel B 
reports the number of funds where managers exhibit bad or good skill with 99% confidence, 
where the number of quarters the fund appears in our dataset ranges from 4 to 56. Skill is the 
ability of the fund to exhibit net, buy, or sell selectivity. Panel C presents the number of fund-
calendar years for which funds exhibit bad or good skill at negative or positive selectivity, 
respectively, with 99% confidence for net, buy, and sell selectivity. In all panels, N is the total 







 Selectivity Skill 
  quarters N Bad Good 
Panel A: Funds Exhibiting Selectivity in Multiple Quarters by Number of Observation Quarters 
Net 2 4–9 557 61 83 
 3 10–17 508 66 60 
 4 18–26 406 57 71 
 5 27–37 179 34 33 
 6 38–48 44 10 7 
 7 49–60 3 0 1 
 2–7 4–60 1,697 228 255 
Panel B: Funds Exhibiting Net, Buy, and Sell Selectivity in Multiple Quarters 
Net 2–7 4–60 1,697 228 255 
Buy 2–7 4–60 1,697 164 199 
Sell 2–7 4–60 1,697 243 176 
Panel C: Fund-Calendar Years with Net, Buy, and Sell Selectivity in Two or More  
Quarters 
Net 2 4 3,034 189 131 
Buy 2 4 3,034 147 109 
Sell 2 4 3,034 160 126 
 
